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In this paper, I address the early climate change impact claims that 
sounded in nuisance, such as Comer v. Murphy Oil1 and Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil.2 I propose that nuisance law and 
the litigation process allowed for the shaping and broadcasting of a 
new narrative that helped both to break new ground in the telling of 
difficult environmental disasters in general and to energize the 
climate movement in particular. Specifically, my claim is that 
environmental litigators remodeled and combined private and public 
nuisance scripts to create a hybrid script for climate change that 
 
* Laura King is a 2013 graduate of Harvard Law School. She is currently a Fellow at 
Western Environmental Law Center in Helena, Montana. 
1 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013). 
2 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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worked—if not through redress, then by narrative relief and 
inspiration. With comparisons to genres such as lyric poetry and fairy 
tales, I argue that litigation allows us to engage in a kind of 
psychological ritual in which chaos is transformed into order. Such a 
ritual is especially needed for the unwieldy climate change crisis with 
its massive scope, global reach, diffuse and unpredictable effects, and 
hard-to-track causes. In fact, litigation is arguably an even more 
powerful ordering tool than other storytelling genres because it 
provides a moral framework with ready-made rationales for why one 
activity should be stopped and another saved. 
The paper proceeds in parts. In Part I, I place my claims in the 
context of relevant recent work on impact litigation and legal 
storytelling, both alongside social change. In Part II, I explore the 
power of storytelling—and, in particular, storytelling via litigation—
as a transformative genre. In Part III, I describe how urgently climate 
change needed such a narrative transformation. In Part IV, I describe 
the transformative narrative that environmental litigators built for 
climate change from private and public nuisance scripts. In Part V, I 
raise and challenge criticisms of the use of nuisance in climate change 
litigation. 
I 
PUTTING THIS PAPER IN CONTEXT 
My claims intersect with a number of threads of inquiry. First, they 
are in conversation with a body of literature on the effectiveness of 
litigation to bring social change. Numerous scholars have argued, as I 
do, that litigation can have more than just precedential effects. For 
example, Michael Klarman acknowledges the possibility for litigation 
victories to cause ripples in a broader movement when he argues that 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of desegregation in Brown v. 
Board of Education caused a backlash in the South that then 
galvanized white support for civil rights legislation.3 Lynn Mather has 
credited litigation victories against tobacco companies with 
mobilizing political support from political and scientific elites.4 Lani 
Guinier argues, meanwhile, that judicial opinions can reach beyond 
 
3 Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. 
AM. HIST. 81, 82 (1994). 
4 See, e.g., Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and 
Tobacco Litigation, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 935 (1998). 
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elite groups, both provoking “mass conversation”5 and sounding 
alarms that alert social change activists to what is possible.6 
In contrast with these scholars, Gerald Rosenberg is skeptical of 
the power of litigation victories to make social change, as the title of 
his book The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
suggests.7 But before registering his disappointment with litigation 
outcomes, Rosenberg articulates their potential power, looking to 
their persuasive, symbolic, and atmospheric capacities. For example, 
Rosenberg imagines that judicial decisions may be resources for 
change, may bring salience to issues, and may exert pressure on the 
other branches.8 
Nevertheless, whether they are ultimately discouraged or optimistic 
about the power of litigation, most of the scholars exploring this area 
have focused on litigation outcomes as resources for change. My 
attention is instead on an available part of the litigation process. 
Specifically, I examine an instance of creative claim making—climate 
change nuisance claims—in which a new legal narrative soothed 
psychological chaos and initiated problem-solving by giving shape 
and in particular by assigning agency to an amorphous problem. That 
is, my theory is that the creation of a new legal claim has power 
wholly apart from the power of a litigation victory (or litigation loss)9 
or a court decision. 
I do not mean to suggest that in the conversation about litigation’s 
ability to bring social change, the potential power of the litigation 
process has been ignored; on the contrary, it has been a central part. 
In 1997, Thomas Stoddard observed that some rule shifts were 
accompanied by culture shifts (e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 
while others were not (e.g., New Zealand’s progressive gay rights 
laws), and he was curious about what accounted for the difference. 10 
Noting that “how change is made matters almost as much as what is, 
 
5 Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 
B.U. L. REV. 539, 556 (2009). 
6 Id. at 556. 
7 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 420 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the “mostly disappointing results of attempts to 
use the courts to produce significant social reform in civil rights, abortion, women’s rights, 
the environment, reapportionment, criminal rights, and same-sex marriage”). 
8 Id. at 8. 
9 Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (discussing 
the productive effects of litigation losses on social movements). 
10 Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social 
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997). 
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in the end, done,”11 Stoddard identified the process—specifically, 
unhurried, informal public debate—as a major feature of successful 
culture-shifting rule shifts.12 Stoddard’s rule-shifting/culture-shifting 
framework has been a foundational concept in this body of literature, 
and it is a productive starting point for my claims. But rather than 
trying to determine the relationship between rule-shifting and culture-
shifting, I suggest in this paper that litigation can succeed in shifting 
culture even when it fails to shift rules and that it does so because it 
shares some of the features of Stoddard’s successful rules. That is, it 
engages public attention, and it frees public imagination. In the case 
of climate change nuisance suits, it does so through the medium of 
story. 
Accordingly, my theory is also in conversation with the literature 
on narrative in the law as a force for social change.13 Scholars 
acknowledge the power of stories in law to make social change in a 
range of contexts: in briefs as an influence on judges,14 in legal 
scholarship,15 in dispute resolutions beyond courts (such as in 
restorative justice efforts),16 and in judges’ written opinions and oral 
dissents.17 Again, this paper adds to this array of materials by positing 
yet another context for legal narrative as social change maker: 
creative claim making. I am not referring to the bringing of claims, 
although that too can be creative. Instead, I am referring to the 
invention of new causes of action. My idea is that social change also 
occurs when new challenges, like climate change, are clothed in new 
legal narratives fashioned from old and flexible materials, such as 
nuisance law. Thus, my claim echoes Robert Cover’s concept that law 
is a “resource in signification”18—meaning that, like language, it is 
 
11 Id. at 977. 
12 See id. at 977–78. 
13 Note that I am narrowing the vast body of literature on narrative in the law to just 
that addressing narrative in the law as a force for social change. 
14 See Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power 
of Story, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1 (2010). 
15 See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on 
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). 
16 John Braithwaite, Narrative and “Compulsory Compassion,” 31 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 425 (2006). 
17 See Guinier, supra note 5; Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through 
Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008); Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
135 (2007). 
18 ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT 
COVER 100 (1992). 
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expressive. Cover gives the example that capital punishment is used 
“to express the dignity of human life.”19 Also, like language, law is 
not a limited resource with a fixed set of materials, but a flexible and 
expanding one. 
My approach is also similar to that of Anthony Amsterdam and 
Jerome Bruner in Minding the Law.20 Amsterdam and Bruner 
conceive of legal argument as drawing on—and contributing to—a 
cultural storehouse of mythic structures. I resonate with Amsterdam 
and Bruner’s instinct that law is closely bound to myth, and in 
particular with their concept of law not just as a recycler of myths, but 
as a creator of myths. Sometimes a culture needs new myths. Our era 
of climate change is such a time. Law provides the needed 




Law is not just a governance tool; it is also a storytelling tool. Our 
society has several important realms for storytelling. One is religion, 
and another is art, especially literature, music, and film. Although 
religion and art are more obvious vehicles for story, legal storytelling 
has its own power. Like religious storytelling, legal storytelling has 
moral force. Although jurists bind themselves to the mast of existing 
law, refusing (at least explicitly) to inject their own moral judgments 
into their decisions, common and statutory laws serve as society’s 
declaration of right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable, 
acceptable and unacceptable. The judges who apply this law therefore 
act as a kind of conscience for the culture. Or, at the very least, there 
is overlap and dialog between morality and law. Unlike legal stories, 
the same religious stories are passed down; the point is repetition and 
memory. By contrast, legal stories are offered up in forms that are as 
varied and novel as life. Litigators and judges, always facing new 
details, have the power to exercise creativity (you might call it 
flexibility) in telling the facts and applying the law to the facts. 
Similarly, the choice of claim can be a creative act. As a result, legal 
storytelling offers  something like the creativity found in art on the 
 
19 Id. n.22. 
20 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: HOW COURTS 
RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND HOW THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAY WE 
UNDERSTAND THE LAW—AND OURSELVES (2000). 
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one hand and something like the moral force found in religion on the 
other. We need this kind of storytelling tool, which allows us to make 
sense of new kinds of harm by creatively casting them in relation to 
the moral expectations embodied by our system of law. 
A. Dull Stories, Good Stories, Better Stories, and Best Stories 
Legal stories follow the usual rules of effective narration. A dull 
story tracks expectations: if asked “what happened today?,” we might 
respond “nothing much” if our day was as expected; if pressed, we 
could bore our listener with a recounting of the usual details. By 
contrast, a good story upends expectations. There is news: a fire along 
the freeway during the morning commute or a hoped-for but 
surprising invitation. An even better story identifies a protagonist, a 
goal, and an obstacle to the goal. The story need not be complex; 
think of the classic children’s book The Very Hungry Caterpillar by 
Eric Carle.21 A caterpillar, our protagonist, pops out of a tiny egg. His 
goal is to satisfy his hunger, which soon appears to be insatiable as he 
eats through fruits, cake, a pickle, Swiss cheese, and more. In the 
most intriguing stories, the goal and the obstacle are well-matched. 
We are eager to know what happened next—did the hero reach his 
goal or did the obstacle overwhelm him? The caterpillar does reach 
his goal: he finally gets a tummy ache, eats a leaf to feel better, forms 
a cocoon, and emerges as a butterfly. 
Legal stories are much the same. A legal story in which no law-
breaking occurs does not merit telling. An advocate who is seen to be 
telling this kind of story will be rebuffed with Civil Procedure Rule 
12(b)(6): failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A 
plaintiff tells a good legal story when he makes out a valid claim by 
showing that, on the facts as plaintiff presents them, a law was 
violated. But legal storytelling can do more. A legal story best 
captures the fact finders’ attention when it identifies a goal and an 
obstacle. And it is most compelling when the goal and the obstacle 
are well-matched. As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner put it 
in their book Minding the Law, in the best stories, a hero is thwarted 
in his noble quest by “something equally extraordinary . . . bearing 
the opposite sign.”22 
There have been many compelling stories in law. Striking 
constitutional law rights cases come to mind: Brown v. Board of 
 
21 ERIC CARLE, THE VERY HUNGRY CATERPILLAR (1969). 
22 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 20, at 128. 
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Education,23 Loving v. Virginia,24 and Roe v. Wade.25 In many of 
these cases, the story that the litigants tell is one of discrimination, 
prejudice, or wrong thinking on the one hand and a constitutionally 
protected right on the other. The story may even supersede the facts. 
A recent New Yorker article explains that in Lawrence v. Texas,26 the 
plaintiffs’ right to engage in consensual sex (the goal) was narratively 
pitted against society’s hostility, prejudice, and double-standard 
thinking (the obstacle).27 Here was a compelling story involving well-
matched forces. But in fact, it was a facade: the plaintiffs were not in 
a relationship and were not having sex when they were arrested for 
sodomy.28 
B. Cause Litigation 
The rights cases mentioned above are examples of cause 
litigation—that is, strategic litigation for a cause, such as racial 
equality, gay rights, or environmental protection. Lawrence v. Texas 
vividly demonstrates an important aspect of cause litigation: it is more 
fictional than other sorts of litigation. I am by no means suggesting 
that cause litigators regularly disguise or doctor facts, as in Lawrence 
v. Texas. But I am suggesting that part of a cause litigator’s work is, if 
possible, to find sympathetic fact scenarios and to shape them 
compellingly. A cause litigator is therefore like a novelist. His 
materials are more limited than the novelist’s, but both sorts of 
storytellers have a creative vision and creative control over its telling. 
Cause litigators have a special need to tell compelling stories. This 
is because a cause is by definition a minority or marginal position. 
What separates a cause from a societal norm (a law, for example) is 
sheer numbers: a cause is an aspiring norm, often advanced by a 
small, dedicated corps of supporters. The cause may be opposed by a 
weight of contrary belief, or it may be merely invisible—that is, 
people may simply not know it is a problem. Abortion is an example 
of a cause heavily opposed, while global warming is an example of a 
 
23 Brown v. Bd. of  Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
25 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
26 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
27 Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of Lawrence v. 
Texas, THE NEW YORKER, (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books 
/2012/03/12/120312crbo_books_lithwick. 
28 Id. 
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cause that forecasters have struggled merely to make visible. 
Storytelling gives the maligned or unacknowledged cause a boost. 
Again, I am not intending to cast shadows on the nobility of the 
legal process. I am suggesting that good storytelling can sway fact 
finders to legal conclusions they would not otherwise make. But I do 
not mean that fact finders can be so charmed by good stories that they 
act in spite of the law. Instead, I am suggesting that good stories can 
help fact finders see more clearly in situations where their vision of 
how the facts apply to the law is clouded, for example, by prejudice 
or ignorance. 
C. Scripts: Lyric Poetry 
Cause litigators hope to make difficult facts palatable. They do this 
by seeking out and shaping compelling fact scenarios. They also do 
this by bending and shaping legal claims—or what I will call legal 
scripts. 
I use the word “scripts” because the word is not part of legal but of 
literary language, and I hope it calls to mind nonlegal structures and 
organizing principles. I wish to evoke these nonlegal structures 
because I propose that, like them, legal claims fulfill the human need 
to order and understand experience. As I suggested previously, law is 
more than a vehicle for settling disputes. It is also a storytelling tool 
that allows us to situate new factual circumstances in an ordered 
universe of right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable. This 
universe is more than a binary system. It offers numerous scripts in 
the form of legal claims that allow judges to provide a story-based 
justification for their rulings. 
Indeed, I propose that legal claims help meet our need for an 
orderly moral universe in the same way that lyric poetry and fairy tale 
motifs satisfy the human need for order in our personal and 
psychological experience. Of course, these realms are not sharply 
divided but are overlapping. Each of these tools can be thought of as 
“threshold” genres—that is, as narrative tools that touch and 
transform experience at the threshold of order and disorder. 
I borrow the concept of the “threshold” genre from the poet 
Gregory Orr, who used it in the context of lyric poetry.29 Orr 
describes the lyric poem as an invention that allows us to find security 
and order in the midst of personal upheavals such as romantic passion 
 
29 GREGORY ORR, POETRY AS SURVIVAL (2002). 
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or the death of a companion.30 The lyric poem allows us to fashion a 
stylized, vivid, and beautiful emblem out of what was once too close 
and too messy to bear.31 Orr observes that different poets are satisfied 
by different levels of order: for some poets, only the tight rules of 
meter and rhyme are sufficient to swaddle chaos into calm; others are 
satisfied by free-form weaving of metaphor and sound.32 In all cases, 
however, the lyric poem succeeds not by containing all the dynamic 
detail of a crisis, but by formalizing and dramatizing that crisis in a 
way that makes it survivable. 
In Orr’s view, everyday life is a dance between the enjoyment of 
untranslated experience in its raw power and the impulse to order that 
experience into something bearable. The idea of a dance between 
order and disorder is not unique to Orr. As one example, the Navajo 
worldview is similar. The Navajo describe a constant flux between 
two poles of experience: hózhó and hóchxo’, which may be translated 
as beauty and brokenness, order and chaos, or harmony and discord.33 
In Navajo culture, ritual or creative singing is used to restore order.34 
Like lyric poetry in all of its forms, including Navajo song, the law 
brings order to disorder. I am not referring to the physical order that 
law offers—that is, order in the Law & Order sense: the arrest and 
prosecution of criminals. Instead, I am referring to narrative order. 
Gregory Orr says that lyric poetry brings stability to destabilizing 
crises (1) by allowing us to distance ourselves from strong emotions 
by making the experience abstract—by turning it into symbolic 
language and metaphor and (2) by giving us power over the situation 
through our creative transformation of it.35 Law offers us the same 
opportunity to transform destabilizing experience (1) by framing it as 
a legal claim, into an abstraction that gives us comfort, and (2) by 
taking action over it, for example through the process of naming it 
and pursuing redress. 
In law as in lyric poetry, disorder can be shifted into order only 
through creative action. For example, in the moment that what will 
 
30 Id. at 4. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 24. 
33 GARY WITHERSPOON, LANGUAGE AND ART IN THE NAVAJO UNIVERSE 23–25 
(1977). 
34 Id. at 61 (“To control air and to speak and sing the order, harmony, and beauty of 
hózhó is to make contact with the ultimate source of life and restore it to the ideal 
condition of hózhó.”). 
35 ORR, supra note 29, 4–5. 
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later be labeled as a tort occurs, the experience is still raw and 
untranslated. It can be given form only through a process of mental 
digestion that involves, first, a plaintiff’s perception and pursuit of a 
wrong. This “emergence and transformation of disputes” has been 
characterized by William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Austin Sarat as 
the process of “naming, blaming, and claiming.”36 The sequence is 
narrative throughout and builds to a narrative climax. After the 
plaintiff pieces together the foundational narrative elements—
perceiving that a wrong has been done (“naming”) and determining 
who is at fault (“blaming”)—the process of transforming an 
experience into a tort becomes a storytelling competition. The 
plaintiff proposes a narrative that conforms to a legal category and 
that helps explain the events at issue, the defendant counters by 
refusing the plaintiff’s narrative and perhaps by proposing a counter-
narrative, and the court chooses one narrative or the other—or invents 
one itself. 
D. Scripts: Fairy Tales 
My aim in this Part has been to show how legal claims can offer 
litigants narrative as well as injunctive, monetary, or declaratory 
relief. I chose lyric poetry as the foundation of this Part because, 
particularly as it has been described and practiced by poet Gregory 
Orr, lyric poetry offers a clear example of the power of ordered 
language to help those who feel traumatized or overwhelmed to make 
sense of the chaos of experience. However, while both lyric poetry 
and the law offer tools for ordering disorder, there is a key difference 
between them. Lyric poetry can be highly patterned, as where the poet 
employs an established form, such as a sonnet, but it need not be. By 
contrast, the law requires plaintiffs to present their complaints in the 
form of legal claims, meaning pre-set scripts designed to capture 
every human wrong that our founders, legislators, and common law 
judges deem worthy of legal redress. Thus, although lyric poetry 
provides a nice example of the dance between order and disorder, 
other more tightly-patterned forms—such as fairy tales—may be 
more analogous to legal claims and can help elucidate what I mean by 
“scripts.” 
 
36 William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 
(1980–1981). 
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The pairing of fairy tales with legal claims may seem incongruous, 
perhaps because law is rooted in reality and requires its participants to 
search for fixed truths (what happened? where is the boundary? what 
is the harm?), while fairy tales are rooted in fantasy and allow their 
tellers to imagine unreal scenarios (husbands who are literally beasts, 
women who can live for years in dormant states of semi-slumber, the 
transformation of pumpkins into carriages). Undeniably, law is 
society’s machinery for meting out tangible relief to wronged parties. 
But, again, it is my contention that law has an important role to play 
beyond the tangible; I have been referring to its narrative, or ordering, 
role and describing it, by analogy to lyric poetry, as a genre that helps 
us in times of unease and dislocation to find meaning in the mess of 
experience. By peeling back law’s outer skin of tangible relief, we 
can examine its inner core of narrative relief. Analogizing legal 
claims to fairy tales can help us explore the frequently hidden 
dimensions of law: as a psychological salve, as a narrative anchor, as 
a vehicle for affirmation. 
As narrative tools, fairy tales and legal claims are similar both in 
form and in purpose. In form, both genres offer off-the-rack scripts. 
Law’s scripts consist of the body of acceptable claims that a court will 
hear: these may be claims brought for statutory violations, or they 
may be common law claims such as those for trespass or nuisance. 
Just as legal claims take customized shape around particular facts, 
fairy tale scripts37 take customized shape in the crucible of particular 
times and places. The Cinderella script, for example, has taken 
hundreds of distinct, varied shapes. To American children, the best-
known is perhaps the German “Aschenputtel,” published by Jacob 
and Wilhelm Grimm in 1812.38 But there are many others. In an 
ancient Greek version from the first century, a young girl is bathing 
when her slipper is snatched by an eagle, then dropped into the king’s 
lap. 39 In a ninth century Chinese version, the girl’s finery and slippers 
are created by the spirit of a beautiful fish “with golden eyes” that the 
girl has befriended and that her stepmother kills out of spite.40 In 
 
37 What I am calling fairy tale “scripts” were first called “motifs” by A.N. Veselovskij 
and later termed “functions” by Vladimir Propp. See VLADIMIR PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF 
THE FOLKTALE 12, 19–24 (2d ed. 1968). 
38 THE CLASSIC FAIRY TALES, at ix (Maria Tatar ed., 1st ed. 1999). 
39 8 STRABO, GEOGRAPHY 94–96 (Horace Leonard Jones trans., 1932), available at 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/17A3*.html (describing a 
woman’s tomb on which this story was found). 
40 AI-LING LOUIE, YEH-SHEN: A CINDERELLA STORY FROM CHINA (1982). 
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Charles Perrault’s Parisian version, “Donkeyskin,” a poor girl wears 
the skin of a donkey (she is hiding from her father, who wishes to 
marry her) and loses her ring in a cake that a prince eats.41 Despite 
their very different details, each of these stories is recognizable as 
Cinderella: each involves a poor beautiful girl, a wealthy powerful 
man, and a delicate item (a slipper, a ring) that the man discovers and 
that fits only the girl. Just as cultural details are cast through the lens 
of fairy tale scripts (motifs), facts are cast through the lens of legal 
scripts (claims). Indeed, a fairy tale motif can be applied to a nearly 
infinite variety of cultural settings, just as a legal claim can be applied 
to a nearly infinite variety of fact settings. In both cases, the details 
pass through the organizing structure and are shaped by it. 
This shaping serves many psychological functions. Specifically, 
both legal and fairy tale scripts allow us to tame our destabilizing 
emotions and receive societal affirmation. That fairy tales have this 
power has been articulated most persuasively by Bruno Bettelheim. 
Like Gregory Orr, Bettelheim views life as chaotic, as a cause of 
psychological upheaval. “A struggle against severe difficulties in life 
is unavoidable,” Bettelheim says.42 And yet, also like Orr, Bettelheim 
believes this upheaval can be tamed—in his view, through the reading 
of fairy tales during childhood. According to Bettelheim, fairy tales 
help children civilize their raw and inarticulate feelings—the 
bewildering emotions that appear in reaction to the complex world 
within which children live and must “learn to cope.”43 
Specifically, Bettelheim believes that fairy tales help a child “bring 
his inner house into order” by subtly affirming difficult feelings and 
providing solutions.44 According to Bettelheim, children feel 
validated when their emotions—fear, anger, curiosity, guilt—are 
modeled by other children and adults in troubling situations.45 And 
they feel empowered when they see “examples of both temporary and 
permanent solutions to pressing difficulties.”46 At the same time, fairy 
tales do not present only “wish-fulfilling images” to the child or 
expose him only “to the sunny side of things.”47 Instead, they show 
 
41 Charles Perrault, Donkeyskin, in THE CLASSIC FAIRY TALES, supra note 38, at 109. 
42 BRUNO BETTELHEIM, THE USES OF ENCHANTMENT: THE MEANING AND 
IMPORTANCE OF FAIRY TALES 8 (1976). 
43 Id. at 7. 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Id. at 6. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 7. 
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that “the source of much that goes wrong in life is due to our very 
own natures—the propensity of all men for acting aggressively, 
asocially, selfishly, out of anger and anxiety.”48 Thus, fairy tales 
soothe children through tough love: they affirm children’s experience 
that life is challenging, demonstrate that it is possible to overcome 
challenges using courage and cleverness, and teach that things 
sometimes turn out disastrously nevertheless. 
Like fairy tales, legal claims are structures into which litigants can 
channel hard-to-handle emotions—anger, powerlessness, 
vulnerability. Likewise, the legal process offers litigants the 
possibility of solutions—in the form of redress—and affirmation. 
That a craving for affirmation motivates litigants has been 
demonstrated, paradoxically, by studies showing that apology can cut 
short or avert litigation. For example, apology has been shown to 
move parties closer to settlement49 or to defuse anger and prevent a 
legal dispute from arising in the first place.50 A possible implication 
of this work is that litigants crave validation that their narrative is 
right and that their opponent’s narrative is wrong. That is, although 
relief may come, say, in the form of money, it is arguably not the 
money alone that brings satisfaction, but also—and importantly—
what the money represents: society’s stamp of approval on a winning 
narrative. 
Fairy tales not only give children affirmation and solutions; they 
also allow children simply to distance themselves from trauma 
through drama, symbolism, and embroidery. Witness ordinary little 
girls costumed as Disney princesses—Snow White, Cinderella, Belle, 
Ariel—adapted from fairy tales to see the drama played out. And 
consider the dream-like symbols of fairy tales: the egg that the new 
wife is not to drop, but tellingly lets fall into the blood of her slain 
predecessors in versions of Bluebeard;51 the rose petal that the young 
girl eats that becomes a pregnancy in a version of Sleeping Beauty.52 
According to Bettelheim, such symbols, and the frequent use of 
descriptions rather than proper names for fairy tale characters 
 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1165, 1167 (1997). 
50 Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1022 
(1999) (citing a medical malpractice study). 
51 BETTELHEIM, supra note 42, at 301. 
52 Giambattista Basile, The Young Slave, in THE CLASSIC FAIRY TALES, supra note 38, 
at 80. 
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(“Beauty,” “Red Riding Hood,” “Snow White”) allow listeners to 
superimpose their own troubles, fears, and conflicts onto the tales.53 
In this way, when processed through fairy tales, traumatic experiences 
can be made into emblems that can be viewed from a distance. 
In much the same way, litigants channel their emotions and 
distance themselves from traumatic events through legal narratives. 
For example, litigants’ emotions—say, frustration and anger—are 
channeled into the ritual and creative moves and countermoves made 
by the opposing lawyers. And all the formal trappings that may attend 
a lawsuit—service of the complaint, briefing, oral argument, 
courtrooms with their stated and unstated rules of conduct and dress, 
written opinions—transform something that was once personal, 
perhaps even unseen, into a visible, formalized activity upon which a 
community turns its sober attention. 
Perhaps the most visible function of fairy tales, especially to adults, 
is their moral content. Fairy tales are not fables, of course; their 
morals are not declared. But fairy tales do arise from within a moral 
framework, and they serve an ethical norming function for children. 
As Bettelheim puts it, the fairy tale provides “a moral education 
which subtly, and by implication only, conveys to him the advantages 
of moral behavior, not through abstract ethical concepts but through 
that which seems tangibly right and therefore meaningful to him.”54 
Legal claims similarly gratify litigants by placing their stories within 
a framework of right and wrong. Although law is not morality, it 
arises from morality. Legal claim making serves the same ethical 
norming function offered by fairy tales: it takes raw experience and 
processes it through a storehouse of cultural expectations. 
Thus, fairy tales are an apt analogy to legal claims because they 
highlight the kind of restorative psychological work that legal claims 
can provide for litigants through scripted narratives that reflect and 
affirm societal understandings. That said, in both law and fairy tales, 
gradual change is always happening at the margins. Scripts are scripts 
because they are useful: they are individually flexible enough and 
collectively broad enough to respond to nearly every human crisis—
to accommodate nearly every mess of which humans yearn to make 
ordered sense. But circumstances that do not fit existing scripts do 
arise. Thus, fairy tales are also an apt analogy to legal claims because 
they demonstrate, in their varied faces across cultures, that scripts that 
 
53 BETTELHEIM, supra note 42, at 40–41. 
54 Id. at 5. 
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have served well in particular circumstances may call for revisions, 
large or small, to new circumstances. For example, in a culture in 
which mothers are especially revered, a fairy tale may cast an aunt or 
childless old woman in what is elsewhere a mother’s evil role, such as 
happens in the story of Hansel and Gretel.55 Likewise, legal claims 
may be revised to address new wrongs, such as the consequences of 
climate chaos caused by greenhouse gas emitters. 
III 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
The storytelling material above, with its wide-ranging analogies to 
poetry and fairy tales, will now serve as the foundation for my next 
point: climate change is a modern destabilizing crisis. It breeds 
emotion, including fear, impatience, and vulnerability. People feel a 
desire to make sense of this crisis and have done so through story. 
Apocalyptic visions in literature and film are common these days.56 
However, those who feel overwhelmed or victimized by climate 
change have had trouble telling their story and receiving redress 
(narrative or otherwise) through the legal system. Among the many 
legal scripts available, there are none that will accommodate the story 
that environmental litigators want to tell about climate change. As a 
result, environmental litigators—the good cause litigators and creative 
storytellers that they are—have designed a tailor-made, or at least 
tailor-altered, script. 
Climate change is not a new phenomenon—our climate has been 
shifting for as far back in time as scientists can see. Nor are major 
human impacts on vast natural systems unprecedented. Indeed, 
humans have changed the face of the earth. We have colonized the 
globe, spreading cities, suburbs, and agriculture. We have 
extinguished animals. Most notably, perhaps, is our possible key role 
in the Quaternary extinction event—the worldwide extinction of 
megafauna, including the mammoth in North America.57 
 
55 Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm, Hansel and Gretel, in THE CLASSIC FAIRY TALES, 
supra note 38, at 184. 
56 For example, consider books written by Margaret Atwood, Octavia E. Butler, and 
Cormac MacCarthy. 
57 Paul S. Martin, Prehistoric Overkill: The Global Model, in QUATERNARY 
EXTINCTIONS: A PREHISTORIC REVOLUTION 354, 357 (Paul S. Martin & Richard G. Klein 
eds., 1984). 
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However, while there are aspects of the current crisis that mirror 
previously-seen scenarios, there are also new aspects. First, I grant 
that climate change, like the Quaternary extinction event, is a version 
of the tragedy of the commons scenario in which each user of a 
common resource takes more than he would if he were caring for the 
resource alone. If continued unchecked, such behavior leads to 
collapse of the resource.58 In the climate context, every participant in 
the climate system (each carmaker, farmer, and consumer) is releasing 
more greenhouse gas (GHG) into the atmosphere—and thus taking 
more than their share of the available flexibility in the system—than 
they would if they were caring for the system alone. That said, the 
climate change context differs along important dimensions from other 
tragedy of the commons scenarios. Specifically, never has the 
commons been so big, so diffuse and unpredictable in its effects, and 
so causally complex. 
First, the climate commons is global. It is true that other human 
changes to natural systems have had global effects. Both human 
changes to earth’s landscape and the Quaternary extinction event are 
examples: nearly every corner of the earth’s landscape has been 
remade by human civilization, and extinctions occurred on every 
continent during the Quaternary.59 Climate change is nevertheless 
different. The difference lies not in the scale of the effects, but in the 
scale of the commons. In the climate context, the commons itself is 
global, so that GHG additions anywhere in the world contribute to 
total GHG in the atmosphere, and these GHGs have a collective effect 
on weather everywhere. By contrast, the decimation of mammoths in 
North America did not affect the decimation of giant kangaroos in 
Australia during the Quaternary. In comparison with the truly global 
climate commons, the extinction event, although worldwide, was 
really the combined collapse of many smaller commons. 
Second, pressure on the climate commons has diffuse and 
unpredictable effects. That is, GHGs released anywhere will 
contribute to warming that in turn leads to weather events that may 
strike anywhere else. Thus, GHGs released by a coal-fired power 
 
58 The classic description of the “tragedy of the commons” is contained in Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). However, Hardin was 
not the first to observe the phenomenon that a shared resource will be overexploited under 
conditions of individualistic competition. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a 
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). 
59 See Martin, supra note 57, at 357–58. 
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plant in Pennsylvania may contribute to warming that breeds a 
typhoon in India. 
Third, the chain of causation is impossible to track. Scientists 
describe that every addition of GHGs contributes to the worldwide 
bank of GHGs in our atmosphere. In a 2007 article, John Sterman and 
Linda Sweeney analogize the atmosphere to a bathtub that is filling 
with GHGs faster than it is draining.60 This is a good analogy for 
several reasons, one of which is that the molecules of gas that 
polluters send into the atmosphere are like the water molecules in a 
bathtub; they are not name-tagged, nor do they act independently. 
Thus, the CEO of the Pennsylvania coal-fired plant is not in any 
straightforward or intuitive way to blame for typhoons in India, and 
yet he is about as much to blame as anyone is. 
Here is a situation, then, in which companies and individuals are 
each pulling gently on the puppet strings of the sensitive global 
weather system. Each of the impacts is small, the cumulative effects 
are diffuse and unpredictable, and the results are impossible to trace 
to particular causes. As a result, the legal basis for assigning blame 
rests on uncertain footing. At the same time, the pressure to tell the 
climate change story through the law is powerful, for climate change 
is causing current, and threatening future, destabilization. 
The storytelling material in the previous Part comes to bear in three 
ways in this Part. First, I am proposing that climate change is causing 
collective anxiety in America that the artists among us are 
transforming into novels, essays, film, poetry, song, visual art, dance, 
and more. In this way, just as with lyric poetry and fairy tales, the 
artist or storyteller and his or her audience are given the power to 
channel their emotions and to distance themselves from and exert 
control over the destabilizing global warming experience, making of 
it something ordered that we can make peace with—or be inspired 
with the courage to change. 
Second, I am proposing that law as a narrative tool stabilizes the 
psychological upheaval caused by climate change in a unique way. 
Specifically, law offers storytellers a chance to be heard by their 
community and to receive validation by their culture—not just the 
present embodiment of their culture, but also its past as contained in 
the constitution, common law, or statutes. Thus, law offers a chance 
 
60 John D. Sterman & Linda Booth Sweeney, Understanding Public Complacency 
About Climate Change: Adults’ Mental Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation 
of Matter, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 213, 216 (2007). 
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for litigants to have their stories validated and placed into a moral 
framework of right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable. 
Third, I am proposing that to order disorder and place it into a 
moral framework in a way that serves the psychological well-being of 
the culture as a whole, cause litigators must tell good stories. Good 
stories, as described above with reference to Anthony Amsterdam and 
Jerome Bruner’s book Minding the Law, involves a protagonist, a 
goal, and an obstacle to the goal. To tell these stories, the cause 
litigator looks to the world for his material and chooses the starkest, 
most compelling scenarios. 
Environmental cause litigators looked to the world in this way, and 
their eyes fell on the Alaskan village of Kivalina. The facts of 
Kivalina, as borne out in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp.,61 involve striking contrasts that make for good storytelling. 
The protagonists are the residents of Kivalina—about four hundred 
Inupiat Eskimos—and their village on the tip of a six-mile barrier reef 
located between the Chukchi Sea and the Kivalina and Wulik 
Rivers.62 Their goal is simple: to continue living as they and their 
ancestors have lived “since time immemorial,” as their lawyers put it 
in the complaint.63 Of course, as in any good story, we can expect the 
steady state to be disturbed by trouble or, in other words, for the goal 
to encounter an obstacle. In this case, that trouble or obstacle is the 
imminent destruction of the village, which can only be forestalled by 
urgent and expensive action. As the lawyers tell it, the “[h]ouses and 
buildings are in imminent danger of falling into the sea as the village 
is battered by storms and its ground crumbles from underneath it.”64 
Meanwhile, the only solution is a relocation to the mainland that will 
cost “hundreds of millions of dollars.”65 
Here, our sympathies are with the protagonists and their goal, and 
the goal and obstacle are well-matched. First, the goal is a worthy 
one: the perpetuation of a village that has existed for tens of 
thousands of years. And the protagonists have our sympathies: they 
are an established culture, vulnerable on their narrow barrier reef, and 
 
61 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013). 
62 Id. at 868–69. 
63 Complaint for Damages Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2012) (No. C 08-1138 SBA), 2008 WL 594713. 
64 Id. at 2. 
65 Id. at 1. 
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innocent of the harms that cause global warming. On the other hand, 
the disruptive trouble, the obstacle, is easy to root against. Its cause, 
as Kivalina’s lawyers tell us, are fuel companies, such as 
ExxonMobil, who are doing things with names evocative of hell: 
“flaring,” “combust[ing],” and “mining”.66 These activities are cast as 
dirty and inappropriate to the steady state of Kivalina, which is the 
quiet, remote, innocent continuation of an ancient human settlement. 
Similarly, environmental cause litigators found a compelling story 
on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. As told in the complaint for Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, the protagonists were landowners Ned and Brenda 
Comer, whose goal was the quiet enjoyment of their private property 
and the public trust use—including hunting, fishing, bird watching, 
boating, and camping—of nearby public property. 67 The obstacle, 
again, was destruction by powerful weather—this time a big-name 
event: Hurricane Katrina. When the hurricane made landfall, as told 
by Comer’s lawyers, it “spawned tornados, mesovortices, wind shear, 
[and] storm surge.”68 This destruction was “fueled and intensified” by 
warm temperatures, which were in turn caused by emissions released 
by oil companies who “mine, drill, manufacture, release, vent, and/or 
combust substances.”69 Here, again, the cause litigators presented a 
story of sympathetic protagonists who were invaded at home by 
destructive weather forces “spawned” by emitters. 
In Kivalina and Comer, environmental cause litigators told 
compelling stories in which residents were pitted against oil 
companies. But storytelling in the legal context requires more than 
sympathetic protagonists whose goals are well-matched to imposing 
obstacles; it demands, of course, that the facts be presented through a 
legal claim. However, at the time that Kivalina and Comer were 
brought, there was no legal claim available to hold companies who 
were emitting methane in Texas or carbon dioxide in Arkansas 
responsible for permafrost melting in Alaska or hurricane damage in 
Mississippi. 
For cause litigators hoping to curb climate change, one possible 
basis for a legal claim was the Clean Air Act (CAA). However, the 
 
66 See, e.g., id. at 5, 7, 9. 
67 Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, 17, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 
1:05-CV-00436-LTS-RHW (S.D. Miss. Apr. 19, 2006), rev’d 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 
2009), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010), 2006 WL 1474089. 
68 Id. at 11. 
69 Id. at 11, 16. 
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CAA appeared then—and remains—a problematic and contested 
vehicle for the regulation of GHGs. First, the CAA’s centerpiece—the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) program—
seemed a poor fit for a global pollutant like GHGs70 in the eyes of 
many CAA attorneys.71 Many environmentalists agreed, noting the 
move’s potential for backlash. Although the Center for Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and 350.org petitioned the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to list GHGs as a criteria pollutant under the NAAQS 
program,72 other environmentalists quickly disavowed that approach. 
David Bookbinder, chief climate counsel at the Sierra Club, gave a 
number of interviews emphasizing that CBD and 350.org were in the 
minority in the environmental community and explaining the folly of 
a NAAQS approach to global warming. “With the exception of Bill 
Snape [at CBD] and a few others, no one wants to use the NAAQS,” 
Bookbinder said.73 The move would “provide little if indeed any 
emissions benefits at enormous political and economic cost.”74 
The “enormous political and economic cost” Bookbinder was 
referring to would flow from the fact that the NAAQS are strictly 
harm-based: standards must be set at the level “requisite to protect the 
public health” with “an adequate margin of safety;” 75 the EPA is not 
permitted to consider the costs of regulation.76 Strict harm-based 
standards that take no account of costs could cause a political 
 
70 NAAQS (National Ambient Air Quality Standards) are set for pollutants—referred to 
as “criteria” pollutants—that come from “numerous or diverse . . . sources” and “endanger 
public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012). GHGs meet this definition and thus 
could be regulated as criteria pollutants. 
71 Brigham Daniels, Hannah Polikov, Timothy Profeta & James Salzman, Regulating 
Climate: What Role for the Clean Air Act?, 39 ELR 10,837, 10,838 (2009) (noting that 
most speakers at a 2009 conference on the EPA’s use of the CAA to reduce GHGs argued 
that the EPA should avoid using the NAAQS program; the day-long conference, featuring 
“a group of the nation’s leading CAA experts,” was cosponsored by the Nicholas Institute 
for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University, the Duke University School of 
Law, and the Harvard Law School). 
72 Robin Bravender, Groups Petition EPA to Set Greenhouse Gas Limits Under Clean 
Air Act, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/02/02green 
wire-groups-petition-epa-to-set-greenhouse-gas-limi-40485.html (quoting David 
Bookbinder, chief climate counsel at the Sierra Club, as saying that CBD’s petition was 
headed to “well-deserved bureaucratic oblivion” at the EPA). 
73 Robin Bravender, Enviro Group Criticizes EPA Exemption Language in Senate Bill, 
E & E NEWS PM (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/media-archive 
/BoxerKerryBillEPA_EandENewsPM_11-03-09.pdf. 
74 Id. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
76 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 457–58 (2001). 
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backlash spurred by the numerous, powerful companies that emit 
GHGs. States would likely join the industry in opposing the 
regulation. This is because the NAAQS program is one of cooperative 
federalism: national standards are set for “criteria” pollutants,77 and 
states that exceed the standards are required to comply, but 
empowered to do so as they see fit.78 This design is appropriate for 
the control of local pollutants. But with a pollutant such as GHGs, 
which are distributed evenly across the globe, individual states would 
have very little control over the concentration of GHG over their 
state; GHG reductions in Pennsylvania could be undone by GHG 
increases in Hong Kong. Political backlash led by industry and states 
could cause a congressional amendment of the CAA—perhaps in the 
form of an explicit ban on regulation of GHGs under the CAA, an 
outcome which would prevent even the more measured forms of 
regulation that are available outside of the NAAQS program. 
Moreover, merely establishing NAAQS for GHGs would take years.79 
More progress could be made more quickly by pursuing other 
options. 
One such option was the motor vehicle provision of the CAA. In 
1999, twenty organizations petitioned the EPA to regulate GHGs 
under the motor vehicle provision.80 The EPA declined to do so, 
arguing that Congress had not intended the CAA to cover GHGs.81 A 
group of states, local governments, and private organizations then 
sued the EPA.82 In 2009, spurred by the US Supreme Court’s decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA,83 the EPA began the process of bringing 
GHGs under the CAA.84 In the mid- to late-2000s, the most promising 
CAA approach seemed to be advocating for GHG regulation under 
 
77 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012). 
79 Bravender, supra note 73 (quoting David Bookbinder). 
80 Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from New Motor Vehicles Under § 202 of the Clean Air Act, Int’l Ctr. for 
Tech. Assessment v. Browner (1999) (No. A-2000-04), available at http://www 
.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064800bcf5c&disposition=attachment&
contentType=pdf. 
81 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 
(Sept. 8, 2003). 
82 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
83 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
84 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499 (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). 
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the motor vehicle provision. And that turned out to be the right 
move.85 Under the CAA, the EPA now imposes GHG emission 
standards on cars and trucks86 and requires major stationary sources 
of GHGs87 to install “best available control technology” for all 
pollutants regulated under the CAA.88 
However, although the CAA now controls GHGs, it remains a poor 
fit for the pollutants, and its grasp over them is tenuous. Stationary 
sources of GHGs are regulated under the CAA only because the D.C. 
Circuit closed its eyes to the EPA’s revision of clear statutory 
language—numbers.89 Climate change litigators searching for a legal 
claim were justified in looking beyond the CAA because it was a 
problematic regulatory vehicle for climate change—and for another 
reason too: the CAA is a poor narrative vehicle for climate change. 
The CAA is a mammoth document that is both dense and intricate. 
Law offices that specialize in environmental litigation, such as 
Earthjustice, hire specialists whose sole focus is the CAA. Even the 
most experienced environmental attorneys in the organization consult 
these specialists. In short, the CAA is intimidating and, frankly, 
boring to the public. Of course, the problem is not unique to the CAA. 
Environmental cause litigants frequently must work hard—arguably 
harder than litigants in other public interest realms—to tell 
compelling stories. It is easy to get buried in complexity in 
environmental law, with its often overlapping statutory frameworks 
and its administrative layers. As a result, environmental litigation 
risks being dry and distant from its animating concerns. Contrast 
environmental law in this respect with civil rights law, where it is 
easier for litigators to find sympathetic Davids pitted against Goliaths 
and to preserve the vividness of this conflict through constitutional 
argument that demands relatively less textual construction and 
 
85 See Laura King, Changing Climate, Unchanging Act, Improvising Agency, Enabling 
Court: The Story of Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 267 (2013). 
86 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38). 
87 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (establishing triggering thresholds for regulation of 
GHGs from major stationary sources); Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 
102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (preserving the Tailoring Rule). 
88 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012). 
89 Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (calling on 
standing doctrine to avoid facing, and thus being faced to overturn, the Tailoring Rule). 
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relatively more appeal to values than does statutory construction in 
environmental law. Contrast, for example, Babbitt v. Sweet Home,90 a 
landmark environmental case, with Loving v. Virginia,91 a landmark 
civil rights case, both decided by the US Supreme Court. As 
environmental cases go, Babbitt v. Sweet Home is among the most 
accessible. And as environmental statutes go, the statute underlying 
Babbitt—the Endangered Species Act (ESA)—is among the most 
straightforward. The ESA contains specific prohibitions, including the 
prohibition against the “take” of endangered species.92 And yet 
Babbitt still suffers from textual and administrative complexity. The 
question in the case was whether the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
(FWS) regulatory elaboration of the statutory definition of “take” was 
a reasonable construction of the ESA.93 That sounds reasonably 
accessible, but when I taught Babbitt this spring to a group of 
undergraduates at Boston College, the students found the case hard to 
remember during later review. They had struggled, I think, with the 
three layers of text: (1) the ESA’s take prohibition, (2) the ESA’s 
definitional elaboration on the take provision, and (3) the FWS’s 
definitional elaboration on the ESA’s definitional elaboration on the 
take provision. In addition to its complexity, there is another limit to 
Babbitt’s capacity for narrative inspiration. While as a practical 
matter Babbitt hugely advances environmental values—by protecting 
endangered species not just from hunting and trapping, but also from 
impairment to their breeding, feeding, or sheltering behaviors—as a 
technical matter, it is interpreting legal tendrils far from the central 
stalk. That is, it upholds an agency regulation interpreting a 
congressional act. That regulation is politically vulnerable to revision. 
So, in fact, is the ESA. By contrast, in Loving v. Virginia, the 
Supreme Court ruled that our country’s core document, the US 
Constitution, granted citizens the right to marry across racial lines, 
finding that right in both the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause.94 In another universe, Babbitt might have been able 
to tell a similarly strong and simple story about the right of animals to 
feed, breed, and shelter. But, in this country, such protection is often 
granted or stripped away at the agency level, and it is at that level, 
 
90 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 
(1995). 
91 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
92 16 U.S.C § 1538(a)(1). 
93 Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 687. 
94 Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
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over language interpreting language, that many environmental fights 
take place. 
Vividness matters. It arguably makes a difference in the injunctive 
or monetary relief that plaintiffs are awarded, and it certainly makes a 
difference in what I have been calling narrative relief. As I have 
argued above, legal storytelling is a powerful tool for the affirmation 
by society of the story of someone who feels wronged. When the 
story is buried in complexity, that affirmation rings less loudly and 
provides less satisfaction. But nuisance, as it has been adapted to the 
climate change story, provides the vivid narrative opportunity that 
many litigants are seeking. 
IV 
NUISANCE 
In everyday language, a nuisance is an annoyance of almost any 
sort. It can be a bothersome circumstance that puts us out or frustrates 
us. Merriam Webster offers the sample sentence, “Folding up this 
map is such a nuisance.”95 It can be an animal that inconveniences us: 
mosquitoes that attack during an outdoor dinner, for example. A 
person who is a nuisance—a persistent caller, a nag, or someone who 
demands our unwilling attention—may be seen as lacking courtesy, as 
being selfish or boorish, or as having clueless bad manners. Nuisance 
in the general imagination buzzes at the low end of harmfulness; a 
frequent formulation is “it was just a nuisance,” as in, “the virus was 
just a nuisance; it didn’t make anyone seriously ill” or “the light 
snowfall was just a nuisance; it wasn’t enough to cause people to stay 
home from work.” 
Legal nuisance is both alike and different. On the one hand, like 
nuisance in everyday language, legal nuisance is capacious, able to 
contain a wide range of annoyances—the actions of people and 
animals, the results of weather. Nuisance has for this reason been 
called a garbage can.96 After one’s litigious imagination has 
 
95 Nuisance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/nuisance (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
96 William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942). 
However, not everyone would go so far. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: 
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 49 (1979) 
(arguing that it is possible to see nuisance law as internally coherent, “admittedly with 
some tugging and hauling”); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of 
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 970 (2004) (“[N]uisance [law] is not so much a mess or a  
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exhausted all other possible crimes and torts, it acts as a miscellany 
category. If something bothers you while you are out in the 
community, and it is not a crime, the next piece of legal logic might 
be: is it a public nuisance? If something bothers you while you are at 
home, and it is not a trespass, you might ask: is it a private nuisance? 
On the other hand, legal nuisance is different from everyday 
nuisance in two ways. First, it is a legal term with a defined meaning, 
with narrative contours, and with moral echoes derived from centuries 
of litigation strategy, judicial opinions, and commentators’ 
summaries. Second, it is not necessarily a mere annoyance that never 
amounts to grave harm. Plaintiffs bringing a nuisance claim may have 
no other legal foothold, but their claim may still be seriously 
injurious. This is especially the case where the catchall of nuisance 
law serves as an entrance for problems that are so new that they have 
no established place in the law. 
By comparing everyday nuisance with legal nuisance, I hope to 
shed light on environmentalists’ use of nuisance law. As I will 
describe in more detail below, (1) nuisance allows litigators to tell a 
compelling story that has moral resonance with both the “bad 
neighbor” and the “bad citizen” stories of private and public nuisance 
and (2) nuisance is both accessible and pliable. 
A. Private Nuisance: The Story of the Bad Neighbor 
We keep the wall between us as we go. 
To each the boulders that have fallen to each. 
 . . . 
Oh, just another kind of outdoor game, 
One on a side. It comes to little more: 
 . . . 
He is all pine and I am apple orchard. 
My apple trees will never get across 
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him. 
He only says, “Good fences make good neighbors.”97 
  – Robert Frost, Mending Wall 
 
mystery as a hybrid between different methods of delineating rights, and that this hybrid 
reflects the information costs incurred in employing these strategies”). 
97 Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED 
POEMS, COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 33, 33 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969). 
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Although private nuisance is a flexible tool that can accommodate 
a range of facts, it has long served as a script for the story of the bad 
neighbor. Its oft-quoted principle in the common law is sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas: “use your property in such a way as not to 
injure another’s.” Meanwhile, the Restatement defines nuisance as an 
unreasonable interference with another’s use and enjoyment of his 
property.98 Although the sic utere doctrine and the Restatement do not 
demand that a nuisance claim proceed between neighbors, in practice 
they invite that framework. That is, in practice, private nuisance 
claims arise between neighbors because, although next door lands are 
distinct (fenced, say) they also cannot help but be connected: “Land is 
not the sort of property over which dominion can be exercised in 
disregard of the fact that land is situated in a particular place, and thus 
is by nature bound to the property of others.”99 
Thus, private nuisance has long served as a legal tool for 
addressing conflicts arising from the land use of next door or 
adjoining landowners. Private nuisance cases have involved, for 
instance, a livery stable sixty-five feet from a hotel,100 a piggery in the 
vicinity of houses,101 a wrecking yard near several houses, a tavern, a 
picnic ground, and a greenhouse,102 a dumping ground for brewing 
waste adjacent to houses,103 a baseball field close to a two-story house 
owned by four sisters,104 and a switching yard kitty-corner to a “well-
kept dwelling.”105 
Frost’s Mending Wall provides a vivid anchor for these sorts of 
neighborly nuisance narratives: there, the neighbors feel a kind of 
physical kinship through the land as they walk the wall between them, 
“one on a side,” replacing fallen boulders to mend their boundary.  
Trespass is one possible neighborly wrong—unlikely in his situation, 
Frost jokes, “My apple trees will never get across/And eat the cones 
under his pines.” Nuisance is another. The difference, as Henry Smith 
has articulated it, is that trespass implements more of an exclusion 
 
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
99 J.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the Neighbourhood, 5 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 5 
(1993). 
100 Coker v. Birge, 9 Ga. 425 (1851). 
101 Trowbridge v. City of Lansing, 212 N.W. 73 (1927). 
102 Sohns v. Jensen, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960). 
103 Kamke v. Clark, 67 N.W. 2d 841 (1955). 
104 Neiman v. Common Sch. Dist. No. 95, Butler Cnty., 232 P.2d 422 (1951). 
105 DeNucci v. Pezza, 329 A.2d 807 (1974). 
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strategy, while nuisance implements more of a governance strategy.106 
Although trespass is a tort, it proceeds from a property-like basis: it 
grants a landowner the right to exclude others from and to forbid any 
physical invasion of his land, whether his exclusions are reasonable or 
not. By contrast, nuisance requires the fact finder to evaluate the 
reasonableness of uses, as for example by reference to the character of 
the neighborhood or the utility of the activity. A nuisance may not 
involve physical invasions or may involve only subtle physical 
invasions: Frost might create a nuisance by opening his orchards to 
noisy, public apple-picking parties or his neighbor might create a 
nuisance by failing to heal a pine canker that infects Frost’s trees. 
Thus, although the sic utere and Restatement standards taken at face 
value do not require it, nuisance tends to be used to complain of the 
interfering—albeit nontrespassory—activities of the next-door (or 
kitty-corner or nearby) landowner—in short, to tell the story of the 
bad neighbor. 
B. Public Nuisance: The Story of the Bad Citizen 
If private nuisance is the legal genre (along with its cousin 
trespass) for the story of the bad neighbor, public nuisance is the legal 
genre (along with its cousin criminal law) for the story of the bad 
citizen. Specifically, the public nuisance script involves an affront to 
the community’s health, welfare, or convenience posed by an action 
performed by a member of the community; in response to the affront, 
the government exercises its police power to defend the large group 
from the individual transgressor. Both historical and modern texts 
describe public nuisance as involving a threat to the common good or 
the general public.107 In short, public nuisance asks whether there has 
been an unreasonable interference with public rights. 
One difference between private and public nuisance is that of scale. 
As an 1883 Wisconsin Supreme Court case put it, a nuisance is 
private if it is carried on in “a place where it greatly incommodes an 
 
106 Smith, supra note 96, at 978–79. 
107 Compare WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 197 
(1716) (“[A public nuisance is] “an Offence against the Publick, either by doing a Thing 
which tends to the Annoyance of all the King’s Subjects, or by neglecting to do a Thing 
which the common Good requires.”) with William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public 
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1000 (1966) (“[Public nuisance] comprehends a very 
miscellaneous and diversified group of petty offenses, all based on some interference with 
the interests of the community, or disruption of the comfort or convenience of the general 
public.”). 
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individual,” while a nuisance is public if it is carried on in “a place 
where it greatly incommodes a multitude of persons.”108 
Thematically, private nuisance generally involves contests between 
two similarly-situated entities while public nuisance involves an 
individual pitted against the multitudes: it is a kind of outcast or black 
sheep doctrine. Thus, a public nuisance may be an obstacle that 
obstructs public access, or it may be a malarial pond or diseased herd 
of animals that threatens public health.109 
C. Public Nuisance Suits for Climate Change Harms 
Environmental litigators bringing suits for climate change have 
emphasized public nuisance claims over private nuisance claims.110 
This is perhaps because public nuisance has traditionally been used in 
larger settings—on a citywide rather than a neighbor-to-neighbor 
scale. Moreover, the public nuisance story fits. The polluter is framed 
as a bad global citizen, fouling a planetary commons;111 the litigators 
in effect are saying you are breaking the uncodified reasonableness 
rules of our shared community. On the other hand, the litigators in 
these suits have also zoomed in to tell the story of two landowners, 
with A’s activity unreasonably interfering with B’s reasonable use or 
enjoyment of his land. For example, Comer and Kivalina were both 
framed as a battle between two property owners, with one 
landowner’s belching of GHGs breeding weather that destroys the 
land of the other.112 Thus, the litigators are also telling the private 
 
108 Pennoyer v. Allen, 56 Wis. 502, 14 N.W. 609, 612 (1883) (emphasis in original). 
109 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (1979). 
110 See Complaint for Damages Demand for Jury Trial at 249–67, Native Vill. of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 
(9th Cir. 2012) (No. C 08-1138 SBA), 2008 WL 594713 [“Kivalina Complaint”] (bringing 
private nuisance claims in the alternative to public nuisance claims); Third Amended Class 
Action Complaint at 30, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 1:05-CV-00436-LTS-RHW 
(S.D. Miss. Apr. 19, 2006), rev’d 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), appeal dismissed, 607 
F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010), 2006 WL 1474089 [“Comer Complaint”] (framing the injury as 
one to the public, and positioning plaintiffs as members of the injured public). 
111 See Kivalina Complaint at 252 (claiming that defendants know or should know their 
actions contribute to global warming and to the “general public injuries such heating will 
cause”); Comer Complaint at 30 (claiming that defendants’ willful actions have caused 
demonstrable changes to the Earth’s climate). 
112 See Kivalina Complaint at (describing how defendants’ GHG emissions cause 
“melting of Arctic sea ice that formerly protected the village from winter storms,” leading 
to a “massive erosion problem” in Kivalina); Comer Complaint at 28 (describing how 
plaintiffs’ use of their property to “mine, drill, manufacture, release, vent, and/or combust 
substances” causes destruction to plaintiffs’ property via subsumption of land, hurricanes, 
and saltwater intrusion). 
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nuisance story that your use of your property unreasonably interferes 
with my use of my property. 
Although harms for climate change do not snugly fit either the bad 
neighbor story of private nuisance or the bad citizen story of public 
nuisance, they draw moral resonance from analogy to both doctrines. 
In effect, environmental litigators have taken advantage of the 
flexibility of the nuisance doctrine to create something new: a hybrid 
nuisance doctrine that calls itself public nuisance, but is something 
else altogether—perhaps a maxi-version of public nuisance with 
inflections of private nuisance. In the process of remodeling and 
combining the private and public nuisance scripts, environmental 
litigators are performing the kind of psychological ordering ritual that 
we as a society need in order to make sense of the crisis of climate 
change. 
V 
THE CONVENTIONAL FAILURE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE SUITS FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE HARMS—AND THEIR UNCONVENTIONAL 
SUCCESS 
Climate change nuisance litigation has nearly met its demise. The 
first blow was dealt by the US Supreme Court in American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, which blocks nuisance claims when 
brought in federal court against electric power plants for the emission 
of GHGs. 113 The Court reasoned that the Clean Air Act and the 
EPA’s action (current and planned) to control GHGs under that 
statute displaced common law nuisance remedies.114 
AEP v. Connecticut left open two questions: (1) whether nuisance 
claims for climate change harms may be brought for damages, rather 
than for the injunctive relief that the plaintiffs sought in AEP, and (2) 
whether nuisance claims for climate change harms may be brought in 
state court. The two cases relevant to these questions are Comer and 
Kivalina. In Comer, as described previously, landowners brought 
nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims against emitters of GHGs 
for property damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. In contrast to AEP, 
the plaintiffs in Comer brought state rather than federal claims and 
sought damages rather than an injunction. But as in AEP, the court 
 
113 Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
114 Id. 
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found that plaintiffs’ suit was displaced by the CAA.115 However, the 
preemption finding is dicta because the suit was dismissed on 
procedural grounds.116 
Kivalina, as described previously, involved the gradual destruction 
of a Inupiat Eskimo village by storms and shore erosion, which forced 
the approximately four hundred residents of Kivalina to relocate. The 
Kivalina villagers sued twenty-two oil, energy, and utility companies 
for damages, claiming that the defendants’ emissions had melted sea 
ice that had previously protected their shores. The Ninth Circuit found 
that the villagers’ claim for damages was displaced, but left open the 
possibility of state nuisance claims.117 Thus, the use of nuisance 
litigation to fight climate change nuisance litigation has been largely 
squelched, with some residual possibility of state common law 
claims.118 
The use of nuisance claims in climate change suits has been widely 
criticized, even beyond its inability to move courts.119 First, it has 
been criticized on unfairness grounds.120 It is seemingly unfair to pin 
the responsibility for climate change on companies whose share of the 
damage is fractional. The amount of GHG that has been added to the 
troposphere over the past centuries dwarfs the amount of GHG that 
has been added by any single company over the past decade. Even 
conglomerates are only responsible for some small part of the climate 
change chaos and, accordingly, for only some small part of the 
damage to particular lands such as Kivalina. It is also unfair to attach 
responsibility for climate change to companies who may be ignorant 
of their climate impacts. This is especially the case because climate 
change is only just beginning to become visible on the landscape. 
Finally, pinning responsibility on companies is especially difficult not 
only empirically but also intuitively: making the leap between this 
hurricane and the venting of this oil field strains a sense of fairness. 
Moreover, judges granting relief to nuisance challengers are 
arguably not helping to solve climate change. This is because judges 
 
115 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 839 F.Supp.2d 849, 865 (S.D.Miss. 2012), aff’d Comer 
v. Murphy Oil USA, 718 F.3d 460, 469 (5th Cir. 2013). 
116 Id. at 855–57. 
117 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 866 (9th Cir. 2012) 
118 State nuisance statutes are an additional source of climate change nuisance claims. 
119 See, e.g., James W. Shelson, The Misuse of Public Nuisance Law to Address 
Climate Change, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 195 (2011); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Why Trial 
Courts Have Been Quick to Cool “Global Warming” Suits, 77 TENN. L. REV. 803 (2010). 
120 See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 113, at 835–42. 
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facing climate change suits are institutionally handicapped.121 First, 
legal doctrines such as standards of causation and culpability, burdens 
of proof, and sharing of liability were designed to deal with private 
risks and are too stringent to appropriately deal with public risks.122 
Second, courts do not have the legislature’s luxury of a systematic 
overview (for example, facing a series of shoplifting cases, a court 
cannot see or address the broader problem of urban poverty). Third, 
legislatures are able to elicit more and better information than courts 
because they are free to range widely beyond what the litigants 
present to them. 
Climate change nuisance suits may have failed, ultimately, in the 
courts. Moreover, the nuisance doctrine may be neither a fair nor a 
straightforwardly effective tool for redressing climate change harms. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that climate change nuisance suits were a 
success. First, they did have some conventional success. That is, 
although federal nuisance claims were ultimately squelched by the 
Supreme Court in AEP v. Connecticut, environmental litigants’ 
arguments did not entirely fall on deaf ears; they did earn legal 
recognition, such as in Second Circuit Judge Peter Hall’s nearly one 
hundred-page opinion in Connecticut v. AEP123 ruling that plaintiffs 
properly alleged a public nuisance claim. 
Another possibility—perhaps deserving of further exploration 
elsewhere—is that environmental litigants have made public nuisance 
more available as a script for other current or imminent environmental 
threats that involve human responsibility for vast natural forces such 
as weather, wildlife, and disease. These are kinds of harm that do not 
fit seamlessly into the traditional private nuisance or public nuisance 
scripts, but that are enriched through analogy to those narratives. In 
the context of climate change, the nuisance script has both expanded 
public nuisance and co-opted the story of private nuisance in order to 
tell the story of human alteration of the weather, a very striking 
example of human puppeteering. By pushing the envelope in the 
climate context, environmental litigators have paved the way for other 
stories of human harm via vast and uncontrolled environmental 
agents. Such stories can be used against environmental values as they 
were (unsuccessfully) in recent litigation brought by cattle ranchers 
 
121 See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1027 (1990). 
122 Id. at 1029. 
123 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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who hoped to limit the state-sanctioned roaming radius of wild 
buffalo in Montana.124 But they can also be used to further 
environmental protection—for example, as a way to hold pesticide 
manufacturers or farm conglomerates liable for honeybee collapse. 
Finally, and most importantly, climate change nuisance suits were 
narratively compelling in a way that attracted the attention of the 
media and, through the media, the public. There has even been an 
accessible book written about climate change nuisance suits.125 
Although they were not tangibly successful, like the CAA litigation, 
climate change nuisance suits were meaningful on a psychological 
level. In Robert Cover’s words, they imbued action with 
significance.126 In Thomas Stoddard’s words, they were not rule-
shifting, but they were culture-shifting.127 Such success is hard to 
verify and measure, and yet I think it should not be ignored simply 
because it resists our quantification. 
CONCLUSION 
The social change effects of litigation are not limited to those 
occasioned by legal victories or stirring judicial opinions. They also 
include those spurred by the process of litigation—by litigators 
themselves as they tell stories in court and, in the case of climate 
change nuisance suits, as they shape new legal claims to encompass 
difficult new social problems. Law is not unlike poetry or fairy tales. 
Like those genres, it offers an ordering ritual that provides 
psychological healing. It is an especially powerful tool for ordering 
our “inner house[s]”128 because it is grounded in our society’s moral 
certainties and thus helps settle and satisfy us as to what is right and 
what is wrong. At the margins of human behavior, such as when oil 
companies act in ways that threaten our earth’s climatic stability, such 
a moral ordering framework provides a needed anchor. Such an 




124 See Park Cnty. Stockgrowers Ass’n, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Livestock, No. DV-11-
77, DV-11-78 (Mont. 6th Jud. Dist. Ct. 2013), available at http://www.buffalofield 
campaign.org/media/press1213/pressreleases1213/010713/FINALORDERANDJUDG 
MENTON(AMENDED)JOINTPETITION.pdf. 
125 See CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA: A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY (2011). 
126 COVER, supra note 18, at 100. 
127 See Stoddard, supra note 10, at 987–91. 
128 BETTELHEIM, supra note 42, at 5. 
